Peter Mckellar, Mary Helen Parsons, James Leslie Mckellar, Charles Mckellar And Glen Mckellar v. Nellie Mckellar : Appellant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1969
Peter Mckellar, Mary Helen Parsons, James Leslie
Mckellar, Charles Mckellar And Glen Mckellar v.
Nellie Mckellar : Appellant's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Carvel R. Shaffer; Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McKellar v. McKellar, No. 11456 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4452
In The Supreme L . 
of the State. of .. ·.;'."', 
.· 
NETH U: .. :SI&A:TAKll 
louth T'hird East 
:t Lab City, Utah 
.:, Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
page 
ST A TEMENT OF CASE ----------------------------------------------------
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT ___________________________ _ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------·-------------------- 2 
PLAINTIFFS' POSITION ------------------------------------------------ 3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' PLEADING AND AFFIDA V-
ITS (R. 14-17) INDICATE THAT THE SUB-
JECT PROPERTY WAS MISTAKENLY IN-
CLUDED IN THE DEED BY MARY HELEN 
PARSONS AND MONTELLA McKELLAR 
DICK GRANTING THE SUBJECT PRO-
PERTY TO DEFENDANT ---------------------------------------- 3 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT THEY ARE 
BENEFICIARIES OF THE PROPERTY 
THAT IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS 
LAW SUIT AND ARE, THEREFORE, EN-
TITLED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SHARES 
AS OUTLINED IN EXHIBIT "A" OF 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 
13) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT IF FRANK 
AND NELLIE McKELLAR DO NOT HOLD 
THE PROPERTY AS ACTUAL TRUSTEES, 
THEY HOLD THE PROPERTY AS CON-
STRUCTIVE TRUSTEES. IF PROPERTY IS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
HELD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, THE 
BENEFICIARIES RETAIN AN EQUITABLE 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AS TRUST-
EES AND CAN FOLLOW THE PROCEEDS 
UNLESS THE TRANSFEREES ARE BONA 
FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND 
WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE TR U ST 
page 
AGREEMENT _______________________________ --------------------------------- 6 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT MISTAKENLY CONTENDS 
THAT P LA I NT I F F S RELINQUISHED 
THEIR RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST TO 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY ________________ ___________________ 11 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT IS NOT BAR-
RED BY VIRTUE OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ------------------------- -------------------------------------- 12 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT CONTENDED THAT BE-
CAUSE THE DEED TO HER AND HER DE-
CEASED HUSBAND WAS RECORDED THIS 
WOULD IMPART NOTICE TO PLAIN-
TIFFS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTEND THAT FRANK 
AND NELLIE McKELLAR DID NOT PAY 
ANY VALUE FOR THE PROPERTY __________________ 15 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
page 
Auerbach v. Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d (1960) __ 12 
Berendsen v. Mclver, 126 C.A. 347, 272 P.2d (1954) _ __ 14 
Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229 (1949) ________ 10 
Jones Min. Co. v. Cardiff Min. & Mill Co., 56 Utah 449, 
11 
15 
191 P. 426 (1920) ___________ ___________________ _____________ __________________ 13 
Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 190 P.2d 135 (1948)-- 9 
Watkins v. Simonds, 11 Utah 2d 46, 354 P.2d 852 (1960) 16 
Webster v. Knop, 6 Utah 2d 273, 31 P.2d 557 (1957) ____ 8 
Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.2d 460 (1959) __ 16 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds §155 ---------------------------------------------------- 4 
23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds §156 -------------------------------------------------- - 4 
54 Am. Jur., Trusts §133 ____ --------------------------------------------------- 6 
54 Am. J ur., Trusts §248 --------------------- ---------------------------------- 7 
54 Am. Jur., Trus'ts §252 -------------------------------------------------------- 7 
54 Am. Jur., Trusts §254 -------------------------------------------------------- 8 
54 Am. Jur., Trusts §267 --------------------------------------------------- ____ 10 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts §90 --------------------------------------------- - 15 
U.C.A. §57-3-2 (1953) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
14 
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees -------------------------------------------- 15 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PETER McKELLAR, MARY HELEN 
PARSONS, JAMES LESLIE McKEL-
LAR, CHARLES McKE'LLAR and GLEN 
McKELLAR, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs-
NELLIE McKELLAR, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
11456 
This is an ac'tion by appellants (hereinafter referred to 
as plaintiffs) against Nellie McKellar, respondent (here-
inafter referred to as defendant) to set aside a deed, a 
copy of which is attached to the amended complain'. (R. 13), 
or an order of the Court declaring that the defenc'ant holds 
the property that i's the subject matter of this action in 
trust for the benefit of the heirs of Mary McKei.lar. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Upon motion of the defendant the tria' court granted 
summary judgmen't against plaintiffs statinr that there were 
no material issues of fact to be determined at a trial, and 
also granted defendant's motion to quiet title to the proper'ty 
in the name of defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment below 
and a remand of the case to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings and for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are children of John M. McKellar and Mary 
McKellar. John M. McKellar and Mary McKellar owned the 
property that is the subject matter of this law suit as joint 
tenants. John M. McKellar died and his wife, Mary, as 
survivor, became the sole fee title holder of the property. 
Subsequent to John M. McKellar's death and prior to Mary 
McKellar's death, Mary McKellar executed a deed wherein 
she conveyed the subject property to her two daughters, 
Mary Helen Parsons and Montella McKellar Dick, and con-
curremy she executed an agreement that is marked Ex-
hibit "A." and attached to plaintiffs' amended complaint 
(R. 13). This agreement indicates that the deed to Mary 
Helen !'arsons and Montella McKellar Dick placed the 
property in trust and that they held the subject property 
for the be1efit of all the sons and daughters, eight in total, 
of Mary McKellar. Mary McKellar died on or about May 5, 
1945. Mary :{elen McKellar Parsons and Montella McKellar 
Dick executei a deed to Frank McKellar and N'ellie McKel-
lar, his wife, which, by mistake, contained the subject 
propery. Fran1 McKellar is deceased and his wife, Nellie 
McKelar, is tht defendant in this action. 
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PLAINTIFFS' POSITION 
The trial court's decision should be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings and for a trial on the 
following grounds: 
1. Plaintiffs pleaded facts indicating that the subject 
property was mistakenly included in a deed by Mary Helen 
Parsons and Montella McKellar Dick granting the prop-
erty to defendant. 
2. Plaintiffs pleaded facts showing that there was a 
trust executed by Mary McKellar for the benefit of her 
children, that the subject property was part of the trust 
and that the trust remained in effec't and is still in effect 
for the benefit of plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' PLEADINGS AND AFFIDAVIT'S 
(R. 14-17) INDICATE THAT THE SUBJECT PROP-
ERTY WAS MISTAKENLY INCLUDED IN THE 
DEED BY MARY HELEN PARSONS AND MONTELLA 
McKELLAR DICK GRANTING THE SUBJECT PROP-
ERTY TO DEFENDANT. 
Paragraph 6 of the affidavit of Mary Helen Parsons 
(R. 16) states she was unaware that the property had been 
included in the deed until approximately November, 1966. 
Mis'take of fact, is, however, a well-recognized 
ground for interposition of a Court of equity. Ac-
cording to the circumstances, a court of equity will 
order the cancellation or reformation of a deed 
where it appears that a material mistake has been 
4 
made, or it may order that the party injured be com-
pensated by a money payment, notwithstanding the 
fact that the deed embodies an executed contract. 
Where it appears that by mutual mistake of all 
parties the instrument does not conform to or ex-
press their in'tention or agreement, as where by 
mistake some material part of the instrument is 
omitted or the deed is drawn to convey a different 
interest or a greater or lesser estate than was agreed 
upon, relief may be had in equity against the other 
party to the conveyance or his privies and those 
who purchased from with notice of the mistake. 
Such relief should be sought promptly upon 
discovery of the mistake, to avoid any suggestion of 
laches on the plaintiffs' part. A grantor is not, how-
ever, chargeable with laches which will defeat his 
right to equitable relief from a mistake where he 
moves within a reasonable time after becoming 
aware of the mistake to have the matter rectified. 
23 Am. Jur. 2d, 201-2 Deeds§ 155. 
It is generally agreed tha!t equitable cancellation 
may be decreed on the ground of a material mistake 
made by one party only to a deed, including material 
mistake as to identity, situation, boundaries, title, 
or amount of land conveyed. A deed may be can-
celled for a unilateral mistake on the part of the 
grantor which renders it inequitable for the grantee 
to have the benefit thereof, even though the parties 
dealt at arm's length and on an equal footing and 
the grantor was negilgent, if his mistake was not 
a breach of duty. 33 Am. Jur. 2d, 203-4 Deeds § 156. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT T H E Y ARE 
BENEFICIARIES OF THE PROPERTY THAT IS THE 
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SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS LAW SUIT AND ARE, 
THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE 
SHARES AS OUTLINED IN EXHIBIT "A" OF PLAIN-
TIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 13). 
Plaintiffs contend that the agreement attached to plain-
tiffs' complaint (R. 13) executed concurrer.tly with the 
deed from Mary McKellar to her two daughters established 
a trust wherein the two daughters held the property as 
trustees for the benefit of all eight children of Mary Mer 
Kellar. The agreement itself bears this out in the last para-
graph of the agreement wherein it states that ... "it is 
understood further, that in the event any one of the eight 
or any one of the above-named heirs die before the estate is 
exhausted or the funds completely used up, then in that 
case, that portion go to the issue or children of the one who 
dies, if the one who dies should die without issue or any 
children, then that part of the estate is to be divided equal-
ly among the remaining children listed above." 
This language clearly indicates the grantor's intention 
was for the trustee of the property to divide the property 
equally among the eight children. When Mary Parsons 
McKellar and Montella McKellar Dick executed the deed, 
Exhitit "B" (R. 13) to Frank and Nellie McKellar, Frank 
and Nellie McKellar took the property as trustees. 
If the property was held in actual trust, then the pro-
perty would still be held as an actual trust today for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries. The law allows a substitute 
trustee to be named to a trust and that subsequent trustees 
are bound the same as their prececessors. 
A substitute or successor trustee when appointed 
steps into the place of the old trustee, charged with 
the trust, and with all the powers and duties of the 
old trustee. He assumes the trust estate, sees to all 
imperfections and con onere, that is, subject to all 
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liabilities binding the trust estate in the hands of 
his predece'ssor. A deed from the old trustee to a 
new trustee cannot pu't the new trustee's powers be-
yond the control of the Court appointing him. 54 
Am. Jur., 113 Trusts§ 133. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trust is still in effect today 
and that Frank and Nellie McKellar are trustees, and the 
children and heirs of Mary McKellar are t'he beneficiaries. 
Plaintiffs contend that Frank and Nellie McKellar received 
the property with knowledge that it was to be used for the 
benefit of all of the children of Mary McKellar. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT IF FRANK AND 
NELLIE McKELLAR DO NOT HOLD THE PROPER-
TY AS ACTUAL TRUSTEES, THEY HOLD THE PRO-
PERTY AS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE'S. IF PRO-
PERY IS HELD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, THE 
BENEFICIARIES RETAIN AN EQUITABLE IN-
TEREST IN THE PROPERTY A'S TRUSTEES AND 
CAN FOLLOW THE PROCEEDS UNLESS THE 
TRANSFEREES ARE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
FOR V A'LUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE 
TRUST AGREEMENT. 
"It is a fundamental rule having great practical ap-
plication particularly in all those fields olf law in-
volving fiduciary relationships that equity will pur-
sue property that is wrongfully converted by a fi-
duciary or otherwise compel restitution to the bene-
ficiary. The rule is actually one of trust, since the 
wrongful conversion gives rise to constructive trust 
which pursues the property, its produc't, or proceeds 
in accordance with the rule. Hence, the rule well 
may be ·called 'The Trust Pursuit Rule,' or 'The Rule 
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of Trust Pursuit.' Under the rule, a trust will fol-
low property through all changes in its state and 
form, so long as such property, its product or its 
proceeds are capable of identification. It will follow 
the property into the hands of the transfeTee other 
than a bona fide purchaser for value, or restitution 
will be enforced, at the election of the beneficiary, 
through r'ecourse against the trustee or the trans-
feree, personally or through compelling the trans-
feree to perform the trust, except in ·so far as the 
transferee is protected as a bona fide purchaser for 
value. The Trust Pursuit Rule applies where a con-
structive or a resulting trust, as well as where an 
express trust has once affixed itself to property in 
a certain state or form. 
This Rule of Trust Pursuit has been recognized and 
applied in courts of equity from a very early period. 
It has been grounded on the principle of property 
that ownership continues and can be asserted by the 
true owner as against any withholding of the object 
to which the ownership pertains, whether such ob-
ject of the ownership is found in the hands of an 
original holder or a transferee, or in a different 
form, so long as they can be identified." 54 Am. Jur. 
190-1 Trust § 248. 
"Where the sale of the trust property is unauthor-
ized and a breach of trust, the trust follows such 
property into the hands of the transferee, irrespect-
ive of any security given by the transferee, unless 
the transfere'e is protected as a bona fide purchaser 
for value, the illegality of the transaction by which 
the trust property or funds are transferred does not 
effect the operation of the rule, where the benefic-
i1ary is not a party 'to that illegality." 54 Am. Jur. 
195-6 Trusts § 252. 
"The person to whom a transfer of trust property 
constituting a wrongful conversion of the trust pro-
perty and a breach of trust is made, when not pro-
tected as a bona fide purchaser for value is liable 
and accountable as a constructive trustee in invitum 
and ex maleficio or de son tort. His liability com-
mences at the moment of the transfer of trust pro-
perty to him and continues until there is full restor-
ation to the beneficiary. Such a transferee acquires 
no title whatever; he merely takes the place of his 
transferor, and becomes chargeable with the execu-
tion of the trust to the same extent that such granter 
was chargeable before the transfer." 54 Am. Jur. 
196-7 Trusts § 254. 
In the case of Webster v. Knop, 6 U.2d 273, 312 P.Zd 
557, (1957) the court states: 
"The second que'stion is: Were the subsequent trans-
ferees having notice of the grubstake agreement 
and the original location in the names of the three 
parties to the agreement bona fide purchasers for 
value from the one who relocated so as to terminate 
the equitable constructive trust interest in the bene-
ficiaries? 
The equitable interest of a trust in the beneficiar-
ies may be cut off as against a bona fide purchaser 
for value from the trustee or constructive 
trustee. He must have had no notice, and he 
must pay value. As stated in the Restatement, Resti-
tution, §12 (a) adopted in the Peterson case: A person 
has notice of facts giving rise to constructive trust 
not only when he knows them, but also when he 
should know them; that is when he knows facts 
which would lead a reasonbale, inte'lligent and dili-
gent person to inquire whether there are circum-
stances which would give rise to a constructive trust, 
and if such inquiry when pursued with reasonable 
intelligence and diligence would give him know-
ledge or reason to know such circumstances." 
In the case of Peterson v. Peterson, 112 U. 554, 190 
P.2d 135 (1948). 
"The general rule in regard to 't'he rights of benefic-
iaries to reclaim trust property is stated in 54 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence Trusts, par. 266: 
The right of a beneficiary of a trust to reclaim 
trust property in the hands of a third per-
son or to charge such third person as a con-
structive trustee is primarily a question of the 
status of such third person as a bona fide purchaser 
for value and without notice. Equities of the bene-
ficiary of a trust in the property or funds of the 
trust are cut off by the trustee's alienation or encum-
brance of such trust property or funds to a purchaser 
for value in good fai'th who has no actual or con-
structive notice of any breach of trust in the alien-
ation or encumbrance, although 'this does not, of 
course, deprive the beneficiary of his remedies of 
enforcing the trust against the proceeds in the hands 
of the trustee or against the trus'tee personally. Bu't 
to be so pro:tected 'the purchaser must be both a pur-
chaser for value in good faith, and without notice. 
Equities are cut off only to the extent that a person 
taking trust property or funds in good faith h'as 
given value. 
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One who acquires trust property with notice of a 
breach of trust or who is for any other reason not a 
purchaser in good faith is not protected as against 
equities of the beneficiary, but takes the property or 
funds charged or 'impressed with the trust, notwith-
standing he gives full value in the transaction. On 
the other hand, one who has taken in good faith 
and without notice of any breach of trust is no't pro-
tected if he gave no value. The purchaser, to be pro-
tected, must be a bona fide purchaser, not only at the 
time of the contract or conveyance, but until the , 
purchase money is ac'tually paid. 
Good fa:ith of one taking trust property is depend-
ant upon having no notice, actual or constructive, 
of any breach of trust in the transaction, and of hav-
ing made such inquiry as the law would impose upon 
the purchaser under the fact& of the particular case." ' 
"The general rule is that good faith in one taking 
a transfer or encumbrance of trust property or funds 
exists where he has no notice, actual or constructive, 
of any breach of trust in the transaction and has 
complied with such duty of inquiry as the law casts 
upon him, but a mere denial of all knowledge of 
fraud will not avaiil the purchaser from a 'trustee, if 
the transaction is such as a court of equity cannot 
sanction." 54 Am. Jur, 211 Trusts§ 267. 
The Supreme Court of Utah held that an or1al trus,t was 
created between the heirs of Mrs. Maria A. Haws when she 
executed a deed to her daughter, Arnber Haws, on the 18th 
day of August 1927. Mrs. Haws contiued to live upon the 
premises until her death on March 24, 1939. Fifteen days 
after the death of Maria A. Haws, Amber Haws married 
the defendant. Amber died on March 16, 1945. After Amber's 
11 
death defendant proceeded to probate the estate and acquire 
title to the property through the probate court. The same 
day defendant was granted title by t!he probate court, plain-
tiffs, the sons and daugh'ters of Maria A. Haws and brothers 
and sisters of Amber Haws, filed the action to create a trust 
by virtue of the deed dated August 18, 1927. The court held 
that an oral constructive trust was created for the benefit 
of the heirs of Maria A. Haws when she executed the deed 
to Amber Haws. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Ut. 212, 209 P.2d 222 
(1949). 
The Haws case is analagous to the McKellar case. Mary 
McKellar, the mother of plaintiffs, executed a deed to her 
two daughters and at the same time created a trust for the 
benefit of the two daughters plus the remaining children. 
The property was sll!bsequently conveyed by the two 
daughters to Frank and Nellie McKellar. The intent of the 
mother was cleady for the children to receive an equal port-
ion of the property. The plaintiffs allowed defendant and 
her husband 1to use the property because they were in close 
proximity as stated in the affidavits (R. 14-17). Paragraphs 
6 and 7 state that plaintiffs met with Frank McKellar and 
it was decided that Frank could use the property. However, 
at no time did plaintiffs relinquish 'their rights as benefic-
iaries under t'he trust. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT MISTAKENLY CONTENDS THAT 
PLAINTIFFS RELINQUISHED THEIR RIGHT, TITLE 
AND INTEREST TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Plaintiffs executed a document enti1tled "Releas'e and 
Consent," a copy of which it attached to phlin1tiffs' brief 
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(R. 24). Plaintiffs intended by the document only to allow 
the sale of th'e property specifically set forth in the doc-
umen't. 
The Agreement, Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiffs' 
Amended complaint (R. 13), states that "the purpose of this 
agreement is to supplement that certain GRANT DEED 
MADE and dated this same day and said second parties ! 
have full power to sell, mortgage, rent, lease or other means 
of getting gainful use from said land and/ or lands. Such sell-
ing or mortgaging, however, to be done only with the con-
sen't of 2/3 of the majority of the above named children of 
Mary McKellar." The release and consent (R. 24) simply 
stated that Frank McKellar "may proceed with the sale and 
conveyance of any and all re•al property involved by the 
terms of said agreement or involved in the Warranty Deed 
from Mary McKellar to Mary Helen McKeHar Parsons and 
Montella McKellar Dick dated December 17, 1942 .... " 
Therefore, if the rele•ase and cons'ent is interpreted by 
the Court as authority to Frank McKellar t'o sell the sub-
ject property, it in no way relinquishes plain'tiffs' right to 
the proceeds from the sale. Therefore plaintiffs are still 
entitled to their interest in the property. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT IS NOT BARRED BY 
VIRTUE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Defendants at the hearing relied on the case of Auer-
bach v. Samuels, 10 U.2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112 (1960) wherein 
the Court held that a constructive trust is subject to the 
statute of !'imitation's. 
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Even under the plaintiffs' theory of wrongful dis-
tribution and constructive trust, the period whh'in 
which an action must be commenced begins to run 
from the time the person entitled to the property 
knows, or by reasonable diligence and inquiry should 
know, the relative facts. 
Pl~intiffs d'id not have knowledge that the property 
had been conveyed to Frank and Nellie McKellar as evi-
denced by their affidavits Paragraphs 5 & 6 (R. 14-17). 
Therefore they had no reason to make inquiry or a diligent 
search as to whether or not the property had been conveyed 
because Frank and Nellie McKellar were given the right to 
use the property by plaintiffs, as stated in their affidavits 
(R. 14-17). Pl1aintiffs contend that this fact would preclude 
a duty of inquiry on plaintiffs to discover the conveyance 
of the subjec't property to Frank and Nellie McKellar. 
In Jones Min. Co. v. Cardiff Min. and Mil/ Co., 56 U. 
449, 191 P.426 (1920) an action to have the defendants de-
clared trustees of a certain mining claim for the benefit 
of plaintiff corporation, wherein plaintiff alleged collusion 
between the defendants and the only director of the comp-
any to deprive the company of its in'tereSit in the claim, the 
Court stated that in all such cases the statute of limi'tation 
commences to run from the time when the complaining 
party discovered the wrong complained of or from the time 
when he was apprised o'f such facts and circumstances with 
respect thereto as would put a person of ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence upon inquiry. 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT CONTENDED THAT BECAUSE 
THE DEED TO HER AND HER DECEA'SED HUS-
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BAND WAS RECORDED THIS WOULD IMPART 
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS. 57-3-2 U.C.A. (1953) states: 
Every conveyance, or instrument in wri'ting affect. 
ing real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, 
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, 
and every patent to lands within this state duly 
executed and verified according to law, and every 
judgment, order or decree of 'any court of record in 
this state, or a copy thereof, required by law to be 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder shall, 
from the time of filing the same with the Recorder 
for record, impart notice to ·all persons of the con· 
tents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortga· 
gees and lien holders shall be de·emed to purchase 
and take with notice. 
In the case of Berendsen v. Mciver, 126 C.A. 347, 272 
P.2d 76 (1954). 
Defendant contends that pursuant to § 1213, Civil 
Code, pl'ain'tiff had constructive notice of the con-
tents of the deed because it was recorded. Section 
1213 does not apply to a grantee of the particular 
deed recorded. The section provided for constructive 
notiC'e to "subsequent purchasers and motgagees" 
only. As s1aid in 22 Cal. Jur., p. 724, Section 12: "The 
mere recording of an instrument is not nO:tice of a 
mistake therein .... " 
Plaintiffs contend that the fact that the deed was re-
corded do,es not give notice to plainitiffs. It would be harsh, 
indeed, to require all beneficiaries of a trust (adults and 
minors alike) to check the records periodically to determine 
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whether or not a trustee had conveyed the property in Which 
they have a beneficial interest. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT FRANK AND 
NELLIE McKELLAR DID NOT PAY ANY VALUE 
FOR THE PROPERTY. 
The deed indicates "$10.00 and other good and valuable 
consideration." Plaintiffs contend that they have n:ot re-
ceived any consideration for the property as stated in th1e 
affidavits Paragraph 9 (R. 14-17). In 17 Am. Jur. 2d 433 
Contracts, § 90. Recitals of consideration and effect thereof: 
The true rule appears to be that reci'tals of consi-
deration, unless intended them:se'lves to embody a 
contractual right or obligation, may be contradicted, 
inasmuch as the consideration of a written instru-
ment is generally open to inquiry. In a case in Which 
the consideration for a written contract is mention-
ed merely by way o.f recital or as a receipt, the parol 
evidence rule does not preclude the admission of 
extrinsic evidence to show the true consideration, 
even though such consideration is different from 
that expressed. 
It is the general practice to rec'ite in practically all 
deeds as consideration, "Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other 
good and valuable consideration," regardless of whether 
or not an actual consideration has been given. 
A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust, is 
hound by no unyielding formula, but is free to effect just-
ice according to the equities peculiar to each transaction 
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wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property I 
would result in unjusit enrichment, Haws v. Jensen, 116 U. i 
I 212, 209 P.2d 229 (1949). Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, 
Part I, 1946 Edition, § 471. Defendant would clearly be un-
justly enriched by prevailing in this action; therefore, the 
Court ·should remand this case to the trial court for trial I 
so that jus'tice may be done. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and Court 
should 'be reluctant to deprive litigants of an opportunity 
to fully present their contentions upon a trial, and there· 
fore summary judgment should be granted only when 
under the facts viewed in the light most favocable to plain· 
tiffs they could not recover as a matter of law. Welchman 
v Wood, 9 U.2d 25, 337 P.2d 410 (1959). 
Summary judgment as a remedy should be granted with 
great cautfon. Watkins v. Simonds, 11 U.2d 46, 354 P.2d 852 
(1960). 
Summary judgment should only be granted if there 
are no material issues of fact to be determined by a trial. 
Plaintiffs contend that the following issues of fact re-
main to be determined by the trial court : 
1. Whether or not the conveyance of the subject pro· 
perty by Mary Helen Parsons and Montella McKellar Dick 
to Frank and Nellie McKeUar was made by mistake. 
2. Whether or not Frank and Nellie McKellar were 
bona fide purchasers for value. 
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3. Whether or not Frank and Nellie Mc Kellar had act-
ual knowledge that Mary Parsons McKeUar and Montella 
McKellar Dick held the subject property as trustees. 
4. Whether or not plaintiffs had knowledge of the 
transfer and whether or not they are subject to the statute 
of limitations. 
5. Whether or not plaintiffs had a duty to make a 
reasonable search or diligent inquiry to determine of the 
~ubject property had been conveyed. 
Because of these material issues of fact to be deter-
mined by the trial court, plaintiffs respeotfully request 'thlat 
the case be remanded to the trial court for a trial. 
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